Abstract-By sharing resources among different cloud providers, the paradigm of federated clouds exploits temporal availability of resources and geographical diversity of operational costs for efficient job service. While interoperability issues across different cloud platforms in a cloud federation have been extensively studied, fundamental questions on cloud economics remain: When and how should a cloud trade resources (e.g., virtual machines) with others, such that its net profit is maximized over the long run, while a close-to-optimal social welfare in the entire federation can also be guaranteed? To answer this question, a number of important, interrelated decisions, including job scheduling, server provisioning, and resource pricing, should be dynamically and jointly made, while the long-term profit optimality is pursued. In this work, we design efficient algorithms for intercloud virtual machine (VM) trading and scheduling in a cloud federation. For VM transactions among clouds, we design a double-auction-based mechanism that is strategy-proof, individual-rational, ex-post budget-balanced, and efficient to execute over time. Closely combined with the auction mechanism is a dynamic VM trading and scheduling algorithm, which carefully decides the true valuations of VMs in the auction, optimally schedules stochastic job arrivals with different service level agreements (SLAs) onto the VMs, and judiciously turns on and off servers based on the current electricity prices. Through rigorous analysis, we show that each individual cloud, by carrying out the dynamic algorithm in the online double auction, can achieve a time-averaged profit arbitrarily close to the offline optimum. Asymptotic optimality in social welfare is also achieved under homogeneous cloud settings. We carry out simulations to verify the effectiveness of our algorithms, and examine the achievable social welfare under heterogeneous cloud settings, as driven by the real-world Google cluster usage traces.
prices): When a cloud experiences a burst of incoming jobs, it may resort to VMs from other clouds with idle resources; when the electricity price for running servers and VMs is high at one cloud data center, the cloud can schedule jobs onto other cloud data centers with lower electricity charge at the moment. In this way, the aggregate job processing capacity of the cloud federation can be potentially higher than the aggregation of capacities of separate clouds operating alone, and the overall profit can be larger.
To implement the federated cloud paradigm, significant interest has arisen on developing interfaces and standards to enable cloud interoperability and job portability across different cloud platforms [1] , [2] . However, fundamental problems on cloud economics remain to be investigated. A cloud in the real world is selfish and aims to maximize its own profit, i.e., its income from handling jobs and leasing VMs to other clouds subtracting its operational costs and expenses in VM rental from other clouds. Only if its profit can be maximized and in any case not lower than when operating alone can a cloud be incentivized to join a federation. This calls for an efficient mechanism to carry out resource trading and scheduling among federated clouds, to achieve profit maximization for individual clouds, as well as to perform well in social welfare. A number of interrelated, practical decisions are involved: 1) VM pricing: What mechanism should be advocated for VM sale and purchase among the clouds, and at what prices? 2) Job scheduling: With time-varying job arrivals at each cloud, targeting different resources and service level agreement (SLA) requirements, should a cloud serve the jobs right away or later, to exploit time-varying electricity prices? Should a cloud serve a job using its own resources or others' resources? (3) Server provisioning: Is it more beneficial for a cloud to keep many of its servers running to serve jobs of its own and from others, or to turn some of them down to save electricity? These decisions should be efficiently and optimally made in an online fashion, while guaranteeing long-term optimality of individual cloud's profits, as well as the social welfare.
In this paper, we design efficient algorithms for intercloud resource trading and scheduling in a federation consisting of disparate cloud data centers. A double-auction-based mechanism is proposed for the sell and purchase of available VMs across cloud boundaries over time. The auction is strategy-proof, individual-rational, ex-post budget-balanced, and computationally efficient (polynomial time complexity). Closely combined with the auction mechanism is an efficient, dynamic VM trading and scheduling algorithm, which carefully decides the true valuations of VMs to participate in the auction, optimally schedules randomly arriving jobs with different 1063-6692 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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resource requirements (e.g., number of VMs) and service level agreements (SLAs) (e.g., maximum job scheduling delay) onto different data centers, and judiciously turns on and off servers in the clouds based on the current electricity prices. The dynamic algorithm serves as an efficient strategy for each cloud to employ in the online double auction, and is proven to maximize individual profit for each cloud, over the long run of the system. The contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
First, among the first in the literature, we address selfishness of individual clouds in a cloud federation and design efficient mechanisms to maximize the net profit of each cloud. This profit is not only guaranteed to be no less than that when the cloud operates alone, but also maximized over the long run to the theoretical optimum under any truthful, individual-rational, and ex-post budget-balanced double auction, in the presence of time-varying job arrivals and electricity prices at the cloud.
Second, we novelly combine a truthful double-auction mechanism with stochastic Lyapunov optimization techniques, and design an online VM trading and scheduling algorithm, for a cloud to optimally price the VMs and to judiciously schedule the VM and server usages. Each cloud values different VMs based on the back pressure in job queue scheduling and bids them in the auction for effective VM acquisition.
Third, we demonstrate that by applying the dynamic algorithm in the online double auction, each cloud can achieve a time-averaged profit arbitrarily close to its offline optimum (obtained if the cloud knows complete information on incoming jobs and electricity prices in the entire time span) under any truthful, individual-rational, and ex-post budget-balanced double auction. We also prove that the social welfare, i.e., the time-averaged overall profit in the federation, can be asymptotically maximized when the number of clouds grows, under homogenous cloud settings. Trace-driven simulations examine the achievable social welfare with our dynamic algorithm under heterogenous settings.
In the rest of the paper, we discuss related literature in Section II, present the system model in Section III, and introduce the detailed resource trading and scheduling mechanisms in Section IV. A double-auction mechanism is proposed in Section V, and a benchmark social-welfare maximization algorithm is discussed in Section VI. Theoretical analysis and simulation studies are presented in Sections VII and VIII, respectively. Section IX concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK

A. Optimal Scheduling in Cloud Systems
Most existing literature ([3] - [8] and references therein) on resource scheduling in cloud systems focus on a single cloud that operates alone. A common theme is to minimize the operational costs (mainly consisting of electricity bills) in one or multiple data centers of the cloud, while providing certain performance guarantee of job scheduling, e.g., in terms of average job completion times [3] - [6] .
Urgaonkar et al. [5] propose an algorithm with joint job admission control, routing, and resource allocation for power consumption reduction in a virtualized data center. Rao et al. [3] advocate minimization of electricity expenses by exploiting the temporal and spatial diversities of electricity prices. Yao et al. [6] minimize the power cost with a two-timescale algorithm for delay-tolerant workloads. Ren et al. [4] also aim to minimize the energy cost while addressing the fairness in resource allocation. All the above works provide average delay guarantees for job services.
Ghodsi et al. [7] , [8] study the fair resource allocation for multiple resource types, based on the dominant resource fairness, without optimizing the profit of clouds.
Different from these studies on a standalone cloud with centralized control, this work investigates profit maximization for individual selfish clouds in a federation, where each participant makes its own decisions. Besides, bounded scheduling delay for each job is guaranteed even in worst cases, contrasting the existing solutions that ensure average delays.
B. Resource Trading Mechanisms
A rich body of literature is devoted to resource trading in grid computing [9] and wireless spectrum leasing [10] , [11] . Various mechanisms have been studied, e.g., bargaining [9] , fixed or dynamic pricing based on a contract or the supply-demand ratio [12] , and auctions [10] , [11] .
A bargaining mechanism [9] typically has an unacceptable complexity by negotiating between each pair of traders. Fixed pricing, e.g., Amazon EC2 on-demand instances, has been shown to be inefficient in social welfare maximization in cases of system dynamics [13] . Dynamic pricing, such as Amazon EC2 spot instances, could be inefficient too, where the participants can quote the resources untruthfully [14] .
Auction stands out as a promising mechanism, on which there have been abundant solutions ( [10] , [11] , and references therein) with truthful design and polynomial complexity. Although some recent works [13] - [15] aim to design an auction mechanism with individual rationality (nonnegative profit gain) for trading in federated clouds, they do not explicitly address individual profit maximization over the long run, nor other desirable properties such as truthfulness, ex-post budget balance, and social welfare maximization. Moreover, little literature on auctions provides methods to quantitatively calculate the true valuations in each bid, which are simply assumed as known. Our design addresses these issues.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND AUCTION FRAMEWORK
A. Federation of Clouds
We consider a federation of clouds, each located at a different geometric location, that operates autonomously to gain profit by serving its customers' job requests, managing server provisioning, and trading resources with other clouds.
Service Demands: Each individual cloud has a front-end proxy server, which accepts job requests from its customers. There are types of jobs serviced at each cloud, each specified by a three-tuple . Here, specifies the type of the required VM instances, where is the maximum number of VM types, and each type corresponds to a different set of configurations of CPU, storage, and memory 1 ;
is the number of typeVMs that the job needs simultaneously (see Amazon EC2 API [12] ); and stands for the SLA of job type , evaluated by the maximal response delay for scheduling a job, i.e., the time-span from when the job arrives to when it starts to run on scheduled VMs. In a cloud in practice, it is common to buy servers of the same configuration and provision the same type of VMs on one machine [16] . Therefore, we suppose each cloud has homogenous servers to provision VMs of type , each of which can provide a maximum of VMs of this type; the total number of servers in cloud is . The system runs in a time-slotted fashion. At the beginning of each time-slot , jobs arrive at cloud , for each job type .
is an upper-bound on the number of type-jobs submitted to cloud in a time-slot. The arrival of jobs is an ergodic process at each cloud. We suppose the arrival rate is given, and how a customer decides which cloud to use is orthogonal to this study. Let be the given service charge to the customer by cloud , for accepting a job of type in time-slot , which remains fixed within a time-slot, but may vary across time-slots. 2 Here, is the max possible price for . Such a general charging model subsumes pricing schemes in practice: e.g., time-independent corresponds to the on-demand VM charging scheme, while time-varying can represent the spot instance prices based on the current demand versus supply [12] .
Job Scheduling: Each incoming job to cloud enters an FIFO queue of its type-a cloud maintains a queue to buffer unscheduled jobs of each type , with as its length in . When the required VMs of a job are allocated, the job departs from its queue and starts to run on the VMs. A cloud may schedule its jobs on either its own VMs or VMs leased from other clouds, for the best economic benefits. Let be the number of typejobs of cloud that are scheduled for processing in cloud at the beginning of time-slot . 3 When a job's demanded maximum tolerable response time (the SLA) cannot be met, in cases of system overload, it is dropped. A penalty is enforced in this case, to compensate for the customer's loss. Let (1) be the number of type-jobs dropped by cloud in , where is the maximum value of . Let be the penalty to drop one such job, which is at least the maximum price charged to customers when accepting the jobs, i.e., . Hence, the number of unscheduled jobs buffered at each cloud can be updated with the following queueing law:
(2) 1 We can also consider other resource configurations, e.g., bandwidth, to define the VM types. Our general problem model and the proposed solutions are still applicable to those cases. 2 The optimal pricing mechanism for selling the VMs to customers is an orthogonal topic and discussed in another paper in [17] . 3 Once a job is scheduled to run, it will be served and allocated with all required resources until its completion and will not be migrated to other clouds.
Job scheduling should satisfy the following SLA constraint:
We apply the -persistence queue technique [18] Length of this virtual queue approximately reflects the cumulated response delay of jobs from the respective job queue. The constant is added so as to approximately account for the cumulated delay of unscheduled jobs when the job queue is not empty, while the approximated cumulated delay is reduced with when all jobs are scheduled, i.e., the job queue is empty. Our algorithm seeks to bound the lengths of job queues and virtual queues, with properly set , and hence the maximum response delay of jobs can be bounded, i.e., constraint (3) is satisfied.
Server Provisioning: We consider electricity cost, for running and cooling the servers [19] , as the main component of the operational cost in a cloud. Other costs, e.g., space rental and labor, remain relatively fixed for a long time and are of less interest. Given that electricity prices vary at different locations and from time to time [3] , [20] , we model the operational cost in each cloud as a general ergodic process over time, varying across time-slots between and . Each cloud strategically decides the number of active servers at each time to optimize its profit. Let be the number of active servers provisioning type-VMs at cloud in . The available server capacities at each cloud constrain the feasible job scheduling at time
Equation (5) states that the overall demand for type-VMs in cloud from itself and other clouds should be no larger than the maximum number of available type-VMs on the active servers in cloud . Here, is the total number of VMs needed by type-jobs scheduled from cloud to cloud in . Motivated by practical job execution efficiency, we only consider scheduling a job to VMs from a single cloud, but not VMs across different clouds. Equation (6) ensures that the number of active servers is limited by the total number of on-premise servers of the corresponding VM configuration at each cloud.
B. Intercloud VM Trading With Double Auction
In an intercloud resource market, VMs constitute the items for trading. For each type of VM, multiple clouds may have them on sale while multiple other clouds can request them. A double auction is a natural fit to implement efficient trading in this case, allowing both selling and buying clouds to actively participate in pricing, on behalf of their own benefits. In our dynamic system, a multi-unit double auction is carried out among the clouds at the beginning of each time-slot, deciding the VM trades within that time-slot.
Buyers & Sellers: A cloud can be both a buyer and a seller. A buy-bid records the unit price and maximum quantity at which cloud is willing to buy VMs of type , in
. Similarly, a sell-bid records the unit price and maximum quantity at which cloud is willing to sell VMs of type in .
Let and be cloud 's true valuation of buying and selling a type-VM, respectively (the max/min price it is willing to pay/accept). Similarly, let and be cloud 's true valuation of the quantity to buy and sell VMs of type , respectively (the maximum volume of VMs it is willing to purchase/sell). A cloud may strategically manipulate the bid prices and volumes in the hope of maximizing its profit. We show in Section VII that the double auction proposed in Section IV is truthful, such that each bid price reveals the true valuation.
Auctioneer: We assume that there is a broker in the cloud federation, assuming the role of the auctioneer. After collecting all the buy and sell bids, the auctioneer executes a double auction to be detailed in Section V to decide the set of successful buy and sell bids, their clearing prices, and the numbers of VMs to trade in each type. Let be the actual charge price for cloud to buy one type-VM, and be the actual number of VMs purchased. Similarly, let be the actual income cloud receives for selling one type-VM, and be the actual number of VMs sold.
Let be the number of type-VMs that cloud purchases from cloud in , as decided by the auctioneer
Since VMs are purchased for serving jobs, the job scheduling decisions at each cloud are related to the number of VMs it purchases (9) Three economic properties are desirable for designing the auctioneer's mechanism. 1) Truthfulness: Bidding true valuations is a dominant strategy, and consequently, both bidder strategies and auction design are simplified. 2) Individual Rationality: Each cloud obtains a nonnegative profit by participating in the auction. 3) Ex-post Budget Balance: The auctioneer has a nonnegative surplus, i.e., the total payment from all winning buy-bids is no less than the total charge for all winning sell-bids in each time-slot.
We will demonstrate in Section VII that our proposed doubleauction mechanism in Section V can achieve the above three properties.
C. Individual Selfishness
Each cloud in the federation aims to maximize its time-averaged profit (revenue minus cost) over the long run of the system, while striking to fulfill the resource and SLA requirements of each job.
Revenue: A cloud has two sources of revenue: 1) job service charges paid by its customers, and 2) the proceeds from VM sales. The time-averaged revenue of cloud by undertaking different types of jobs from its customers is (10) We assume the front-end charges,
, from a cloud to its customers, are given. Hence, this part of the revenue is fixed in each time-slot. The time-averaged income of cloud from selling VMs to other clouds is (11) Cloud can control this income by adjusting its sell-bids, i.e., and , , at each time. Cost: The cost of cloud consists of three parts: 1) operational costs incurred for running its active servers, ii) the penalties for dropping jobs, and iii) the expenditure on buying VMs from other clouds. The time-averaged cost for operating servers at each cloud is decided by the number of active servers in each time, i.e., (12) The time-averaged penalty at each cloud is determined by the number of dropped jobs over time, i.e., ,
The time-averaged expenditure for VM purchases is decided by the actual VM trading prices and numbers, as decided by the buy-bids from cloud 
D. Social Welfare
Social welfare is the overall profit of the cloud federation
Since the income and expenditure due to VM trades among the clouds cancel each other, the formula above equals . The social welfare maximization problem is s.t.
-
which globally optimizes server provisioning and job scheduling in the federation and maximally serves all the incoming jobs at the minimum cost, regardless of the specific intercloud VM trading mechanism. When a double-auction mechanism is truthful, individual-rational, and ex-post budget balancing, it is shown that efficiency in terms of social welfare maximization cannot be achieved concurrently [21] . We hence make a necessary compromise in social welfare in our auction design, i.e., the sum of maximal individual profits derived by (15) will be smaller than the optimal social welfare from (16) . Nevertheless, we will show in Sections VII and VIII that our mechanisms still manage to achieve a satisfactory social welfare in the long run.
Tables I-III summarize important notation in the paper for ease of reference. 
E. Workflow
During each time-slot, the entire VM-trading framework works as follows.
• Step 1: Each individual cloud evaluates the prices and volumes to buy and sell VMs, and proposes its buy-bid and sell-bid to the auctioneer. 
IV. DYNAMIC INDIVIDUAL-PROFIT MAXIMIZATION ALGORITHM
We next present a dynamic algorithm for each cloud to trade VMs and scheduling jobs/servers, which is in fact applicable under any truthful, individual-rational, and ex-post budget balanced double-auction mechanism. We will also tailor a doubleauction mechanism on the auctioneer in Section V. Fig. 1 illustrates the relation among these algorithm modules.
The goal of the dynamic algorithm at each cloud is to maximize its time-averaged profit, i.e., to solve optimization (15) , by dynamically making decisions in each time-slot. We apply the drift-plus-penalty framework in Lyapunov optimization theory [22] and derive a one-shot optimization problem to be solved by cloud in each time-slot as follows. We will prove in Section VII that by optimally solving the one-shot optimization at each cloud during each time-slot, the dynamic algorithm can achieve a time-averaged individual profit arbitrarily close to its offline optimum (computed with complete knowledge in the entire time span), for each cloud. 
A. One-Shot Optimization Problem
Define the set of queues at cloud in each time-slot as Since the network stability is achieved only if all queues in the network are kept stable [22] (we will show the network stability by our algorithm with Lemma 1 in Section VII) and the job scheduling/dropping decisions determine the update of job queues and virtual queues simultaneously, we jointly consider both job queues and virtual queues in the Lyapunov optimization framework and define the Lyapunov function as follows:
Then, the one-slot conditional Lyapunov drift [22] is Squaring the queuing laws (2) and (4), we can derive the following inequality (details can be found in our technical report [23] ): (17) where is a user-defined positive parameter for gauging the optimality of time-averaged profit, is a constant, and Based on the drift-plus-penalty framework [22] , a dynamic algorithm can be derived for each cloud , which observes the job and virtual queues ( ), job arrival rates ( ), the current cost for server operation ( ) in each time-slot, and minimizes the right-hand side (RHS) of the inequality (17) , such that a lower bound for time-averaged profit of cloud is maximized. Note that in the RHS of (17) is fixed in time-slot . Hence, to maximize a lower bound of the time-averaged profit for cloud , the dynamic algorithm should solve the one-shot optimization problem in each time-slot as follows:
The maximization problem in (18) can be decoupled into two independent optimization problems s.t. (19) which is related to optimal decisions on: 1) buy/sell bids for different types of VMs, and 2) scheduling of active servers and jobs to these servers; and
which is related to optimal decisions on: 3) jobs to drop. In the following, we design algorithms to derive the optimal decisions based on problems (19) and (20) . It should be noted that each individual cloud is maximizing its profit under a truthful double-auction framework, with which the dominant strategy is bidding with true evaluation of the VMs while not considering the other clouds' actions. Once the true value is found and bid with, the individual cloud has already achieved the best it could obtain for problem (19) . The solution to job scheduling and server provisioning is just a follow-up action once it gets the auction results. The optimal decisions to all variables in problem (19)-i.e.: 1) at which price/volume the VMs should be bided, and 2) how the job scheduling and server provisioning are conducted with the auctions results-are in fact jointly determined during the VM evaluation process.
B. VM Valuation and Bid
Optimization problem (19) is related to the actual charges that cloud pays for each type of VMs purchased, and ( ), and the actual numbers of traded VMs, and ( ), from the double auction. These values are determined by the auctioneer according to buy-bids and sell-bids submitted by all clouds and its double-auction mechanism. That is, each cloud first proposes its buy-bids and sell-bids to the auctioneer, and then receives the auction results, based on which the job scheduling and server provisioning decisions are made. We first investigate how each cloud proposes its buy-bids and sell-bids, and then decide optimal job scheduling and server provisioning in Section IV-C.
A truthful double auction (to be introduced in Section V) is employed at the auctioneer, where sellers and buyers bid their true values of the prices and quantities in order to maximize their individual utilities. Equation (19) is the utility maximization problem for each cloud. If we can find true values of each cloud , , , and , and let the cloud bid using these values, the achieved utility in (19) is guaranteed to be the largest, as compared to bidding any other values. 4 We decide the true values of the bids for each cloud , according to their definitions in double auctions [10] , [11] . The true value of the price to buy (sell) a type-VM, ( ), is such a value that if a VM is purchased (sold) at a price: 1) equal to this value, then cloud 's profit remains the same, compared to not obtaining the VM; 2) higher than this value, a profit loss (gain) at cloud occurs; and 3) lower than this value, a profit gain (loss) results. In a multi-unit double auction, the true value of the maximum number of type-VMs cloud can buy (sell), ( ), is the maximum number of type-VMs the cloud is willing to buy (sell) at the true value of the price, i.e., ( ). Using the above rationale and based on problem (19) , the true values of the buy/sell prices for cloud can be derived as (detailed derivation steps are given in [23] ) (21) and (22) respectively, where (23) and (24) Here, denotes the weight for scheduling one type-job [to run on type-VM(s)] by cloud in , and specifies the job type with the largest weight (ties broken arbitrarily), among all types of jobs requiring type-VMs.
is determined by the following factors: 1) the sum of queue backlogs, , representing the level of urgency for scheduling typejobs in , since is the number of unscheduled type-jobs and reflects the cumulated response delay; 2) the number of concurrent VMs each type-job requires, , which decides the job-scheduling difficulty. The intuition behind (21) and (22) includes: 1) the true value of the price to buy a type-VM depends on the combined effect of urgency and difficulty for scheduling jobs requiring this type of VMs, and is computed based on the maximum weight that any type of jobs requiring type-VMs may achieve; 2) the true value of the price to sell one type-VM from cloud is the same as that of the price to buy, if the latter exceeds the current cost of operating a type-VM in the cloud; otherwise, it is set to the operational cost.
The true values of the number of type-VMs to buy and to sell at cloud are (25) and (26) respectively. They state that the maximum number of typeVMs cloud is willing to buy (sell) at the price in (21) [in (22)], is the number of all potential type-VMs in the federation. The rationale is as follows: The clearing price for transactions of type-VMs in the double auction is at most the buyer's true value in (21) and at least the seller's true value in (22) , if the corresponding buy/sell bids are successful. By definition of the true value, if the actual charge per VM is lower (higher) than the true value, a profit gain happens at the buyer (seller), and the more VMs purchased (sold), the larger the profit gain. Therefore, a cloud is willing to buy or sell at the largest quantity possible, for profit maximization. 5 The buy-bid price for type-m VMs calculated in (21) is proportional to the sum of the lengths of queues with the maximum scheduling weight, i.e., , out of all queues of job types asking for type-VMs, while inversely proportional to . According to our analysis in Section VII-D, we typically use large in order for the system to approach individual profit and social welfare optimality over the long run. Since is large and the sum of queue lengths should overwhelm , if the cloud wins in the auction, there must be many jobs in its queue, such that all the VMs bought will be used (i.e., no leftover capacity). On the other hand, if there are not enough jobs in the queue of type , the buy-bid price would be low and the buyer would not win in the auction.
To conclude, in each time-slot , cloud submits its bids as , , , and , for each type of VMs .
C. Server Provisioning, Job Scheduling, and Dropping
After receiving results of the double auction (actual charges , , , and the actual numbers of traded VMs , , , 5 It may appear counterintuitive that a cloud is willing to buy all type-VMs in the federation, regardless of its number of unscheduled jobs requiring typeVMs, i.e.,
. Interestingly, our proof in Section VII shows that bidding so in each time-slot can achieve a time-averaged profit over the long run that approximates the offline optimum, and our simulation in Section VIII shows that it performs better as compared to a bidding strategy that asks for the exact number of VMs to serve the unscheduled jobs.
), cloud schedules its jobs on its local servers and (potentially) purchased VMs from other clouds and decides job drops and the number of active servers to provision by solving optimization problems (19) and (20 (5) is satisfied by our server provisioning decision in (27), and constraint (6) is met by (28) and (27)], based on constraint (9) . Similar to the previous case, we know that the best strategy is to assign all the typeVMs purchased, , to serve jobs of service type with the largest per-VM scheduling weight , as defined in (23) and (24) . Hence, we derive the optimal solution to the number of type-jobs to run at cloud as if Otherwise.
3) Job Dropping: Problem (20) should be dropped at the maximum rate, i.e., , in order to maximize the objective function value; otherwise, there is no drop, i.e.,
. Therefore, the optimal number of type-jobs dropped by cloud in is if Otherwise.
(30)
In the above results, we note that the derived job scheduling and drop numbers do not need to be bounded by the number of unscheduled jobs in the corresponding job queue, i.e., and are not required to be bounded by according to (2) . Nevertheless, the actual number of jobs to schedule/drop when running the algorithm, is upper-bounded by the minimum between the length of the job queue and the maximum drop rate .
D. Dynamic Algorithm
Algorithm 1 summarizes the dynamic algorithm for each cloud to carry out in each time-slot in order to maximize its time-averaged profit over the long run.
Algorithm 1: Dynamic Profit Maximization Algorithm at cloud in Time-Slot
Input:
, , , . Then, the job scheduling decision for job type can be made in constant time based on (29) and (28). For all job types, the computation overhead is . The server provisioning decisions can be found in constant time based on the job scheduling decisions and the auction results, according to (27) for type-VMs. For all VM types, the computation overhead is . Job dropping is also decided in constant time for type-jobs based on (30). For all job types, the computation complexity is . Queue Update: For each job type , the job queue and virtual queue can be updated in constant time based on (2) and (4). Hence, for all job types, the computation overhead is . In summary, the computation complexity of Algorithm 1 is . Communication Complexity: The input to Algorithm 1 is mostly derived from local information. There is no direct information exchange among individual clouds. The only communication overhead is incurred when a cloud sends its VM bids to the auctioneer and receives the auction results for each VM type. Since there are VM types, the communication complexity is for each cloud.
V. DOUBLE-AUCTION MECHANISM
We next design a double-auction mechanism for intercloud VM trading, which not only is truthful, individual-rational, and ex-post budget-balanced, but also can enable satisfactory social welfare (Section VII, Theorems 2-4 and 8).
The true values of buy and sell bids at each participating cloud [ (21)- (26)] are not related to the detailed auction mechanism. The true values of the maximum numbers of VMs a cloud is willing to trade [ and in (25) and (26)] are time-independent constants determined by system parameters and . These parameters, and thus and , are easily known to other clouds, and hence it is not meaningful for a buyer/seller to bid otherwise. We correspondingly design a double auction where in each buy-bid is fixed to the value in (25) and in each sell-bid is always the value in (26), while the buy/sell prices, 's and 's, can be decided by the respective buyers/sellers.
The following mechanism is carried out by the auctioneer at the beginning of each time-slot to decide the actual trading price and number for each type of VMs .
1) Winner Determination:
The auctioneer sorts all received buy-bids for type-VMs in descending order in the buy prices. Let be the th highest. Two buy-bids with the largest and second largest prices, , , are identified (ties broken arbitrarily). The sell-bids for type-VMs are sorted in ascending order in the sell prices. Let be the th lowest, with as the corresponding maximum number of VMs to sell, 6 such that . Let be the critical index in the sorted sequence of sell-bids, such that is the largest sell price not exceeding , i.e., and (
If there are at least two sell-bids and no higher than the second largest buy price , the highest buy-bid wins, and the sell-bids with the lowest to the th lowest sell prices ( , not including ) win. Otherwise, no buy/sell bid wins.
2) Pricing and Allocation: It is an NP-hard problem to clear the double-auction market with discriminatory prices [24] . We apply a uniform clearing price to winning buy/sell bids of type-VMs, as follows.
• The price charged to each buyer cloud of type-VMs is if bid wins otherwise.
(32)
• The price paid to each seller cloud of type-VMs is if bid wins otherwise.
(33)
• The number of type-VMs bought by cloud is if bid wins otherwise.
(34)
• The number of type-VMs sold by cloud is if bid wins otherwise.
• The number of type-VMs sold from cloud to cloud is if bids and win otherwise.
For example, consider a federation of 4 clouds with buy and sell prices bid in Table IV , each seeking to buy/sell one VM. Clouds 2 and 3 bid the two largest buy prices $20 and $15, which are higher than sell prices from clouds 1 and 4. Hence, the buyer cloud 2 and the seller cloud 4 win, while the clearing buy and sell prices are $15 and $13, respectively.
VI. DYNAMIC SOCIAL-WELFARE MAXIMIZATION ALGORITHM:
A BENCHMARK
We also present a dynamic algorithm that maximizes the time-averaged social welfare in the federation [optimization problem (16) ] based on the Lyapunov optimization framework. This algorithm is used as a benchmark to examine the efficiency of Algorithm 1 in social welfare.
Similar to the derivation of Algorithm 1, we first derive a one-shot optimization problem for the federation to solve based on the drift-plus-penalty framework of Lyapunov optimization, and then derive the dynamic benchmark algorithm to solve it optimally in each time-slot. Detailed derivation of the benchmark algorithm is included in [23] .
1) Server Provisioning:
The optimal number of activated servers at cloud to provision type-VM is 
Algorithm 2 summarizes the dynamic algorithm for the federation to carry out (e.g., on a centralized controller) in each time-slot in order to maximize its time-averaged social welfare over the long run.
Algorithm 2: Dynamic Social Welfare Maximization Algorithm in Time-Slot
Input:
, , (2) and (4).
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We next analyze the performance guarantee provided by our dynamic individual-profit maximization algorithm and the double-auction mechanism.
A. Properties of the Double-Auction Mechanism Theorem 1 (True Valuation):
The VM valuations on buybids, i.e., (21) and (25), and sell-bids, i.e., (22) and (26), are true values.
This theorem is proved based on the definition of the true values and the optimization problem (18) solved in each timeslot by each cloud in [23] .
Theorem 2 (Truthfulness): Bidding truthfully is the dominant strategy of each cloud in the double auction in Section V, i.e., no cloud can achieve a higher profit in (18) by bidding with values other than its true values of the buy and sell bids, in (21), (25), (22) , and (26) .
We prove this theorem by contradiction and show that, in all cases, no cloud can do better with problem (18) by bidding untruthfully. Details are in [23] . The truthfulness can simplify the bidders' strategies when proposing their bids and make the auction mechanism strategy-proof.
Theorem 3 (Individual Rationality): No winning buyer pays more than its buy-bid price, and no winning seller is paid less than its sell-bid price, i.e., and
This theorem can be proved based on the winner determination and pricing schemes in our auction mechanism, with details in [23] . Given that the buy-bid (sell-bid) price is the true value of the buyer (seller), this theorem implies that a cloud can receive a nonnegative profit gain if it successfully sells or buys VMs. The rationale is as follows.
The true value at the buyer (seller) equals the respective cloud's evaluation of the VMs in order to maximize its long-term profit when the cloud's VMs are only utilized to process its own jobs (i.e., operating alone). If the cloud participates in the VM trading and is charged at its true value, the cloud receives zero gain from VM-trading (or equivalently, achieves the same utility as if it operates alone). Hence, we conclude that a cloud's profit obtained in a federation with potential VM trades with others is always no lower than that obtained when operating alone since the VMs in our framework will be bought (sold) at prices no higher (lower) than their true values. The individual rationality provides incentives for individual clouds to participate in the auction for intercloud VM-trading.
Theorem 4 (Ex-post Budget Balance): At the auctioneer, the total payment collected from the buyers is no smaller than the overall price paid to the sellers, i.e., This theorem is proved based on (31)-(33), with details in [23] . The ex-post budget balance property guarantees the willingness of the auctioneer to hold the auction since it has no need to make any payment for the trading and can make a nonnegative gain. (2) and (4). The condition ensures that when the queue lengths grow to satisfy the job drop condition, any further increase on the queues, e.g., and , can be balanced by dropping enough number of jobs at the rate of . Detailed proof is included in [23] . Since each queue can be strictly upper-bounded in each time-slot, our algorithm can guarantee the queue stabilities and the network stability [22] .
B. SLA Guarantee
Theorem 5 (SLA Guarantee): Each job of type is either scheduled or dropped with Algorithm 1 before its maximum response delay , if we have by adjusting the value of . This theorem can be proved based on Lemma 1 and the -persistence queue techniques [18] . The condition on is to ensure that the queue lengths can grow to satisfy the job drop condition, i.e., , if some jobs remain unscheduled in the last slots. Note that a cloud only drops jobs strategically to balance the loss due to the job drop penalties and the gain in saving VMs for other jobs. For more details, please refer to [23] .
C. Optimality of Individual Profit and Social Welfare
Theorem 6 (Individual Profit Optimality): Let be the offline optimum of time-averaged profit of cloud , obtained in a truthful, individual-rational, ex-post budget-balanced double auction, with complete information on its own job arrivals and prices in the entire time span . The dynamic Algorithm 1 can achieve a time-averaged profit for cloud within a constant gap to , i.e., where and is a constant. The proof to this theorem is rooted in the Lyapunov optimization theory [22] . Detailed proof is included in [23] . The gap can be close to zero by fixing and increasing if the users can tolerate a longer maximum possible delay (to be discussed in Section VII-D). achieved by all clouds by running Algorithm 2, approaches the offline-optimal social welfare , by a constant gap , i.e., where and . is defined in Theorem 6, . The proof to this theorem is also based on the Lyapunov optimization theory [22] . Detailed proof is included in [23] . Similar with Theorem 6, the gap can be close to zero by fixing and increasing if the users can tolerate a longer maximum possible delay (to be discussed in Section VII-D).
Theorem 8 To prove the theorem, we demonstrate that when the number of clouds goes to infinity, the one-shot social welfare obtained with Algorithm 1 is the same as that achieved by the dynamic benchmark Algorithm 2 in the same time-slot. Details are in [23] .
D. Tradeoff Between Optimality and Maximum Tolerable Delay
With Theorems 6-8, we can derive that the gap, , between the achievable individual profit (social welfare) with our algorithm and its offline optimum can be made close to zero, when the value of increases (recall that and are constants). However, the prerequisite for increasing the value of is that the users can tolerate a longer maximum possible delay, due to Lemma 1 and Theorem 5 as follows. In order to meet the SLA requirements, Theorem 5 states that the constant should be equal to . With Lemma 1, we know that the maximum queue lengths, , , and , are proportional to . Hence, if we need a larger , the users should be able to accept a longer maximum tolerable delay, i.e., , in order to meet the condition in Theorem 5. In summary, there is a tradeoff between the achievable optimality and the maximum tolerable delay.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
We carry out trace-driven simulation studies based on Google cluster-usage data [25] , [26] , which record jobs submitted to the Google cluster, with information on their resource demands (CPU, RAM, etc.) and relative charges. We translate the data into concrete job arrival rates, resource types, and prices to drive our simulations as follows.
We consider 24 types of jobs , 6 VM types combined from {small, median, large} CPU and {small, large} Memory, and two SLA levels , corresponding to a larger maximum tolerable response delay and a smaller maximum tolerable response delay at half of the former. Each job requires either 1 VM or 2 VMs concurrently . There are 10 clouds in the federation. One time-slot is 1 h. The number of servers in each cloud that provision VMs of each type ranges within . Each server can provide 30 small-memory VMs or 10 large-memory VMs. The VM charge to the customer is decided by multiplying by the relative VM price in the Google data, and then by the unit VM price in the range of . The penalty for dropping a job is set to the maximum per-job VM charge in the system. Operational costs are set according to the electricity prices at 10 different geographic locations provided in [20] , which vary on a hourly basis. Each server consumes power at 1 kW/h.
The number of job arrivals in each hour to the federation is set according to the cumulated job requests of each type submitted to the Google cluster during that hour, in the rough range of requests per hour. We randomly assign each arrived job to one of the 10 clouds, following a heavy-tailed distribution. In operating the virtual queues, we set for jobs requiring low response delay, and for those of long delays. The maximum number of job drops per hour is 1000 for all job types.
For comparison purposes, we also implement a simpler heuristic algorithm for each cloud to bid in the double auction and to schedules its jobs/servers: The cloud decides a value for each unscheduled job in a queue as the penalty to drop it if the next time-slot is the deadline for scheduling, or the charged price upon its arrival otherwise. The true values of buy/sell prices for a type-VM at this cloud are set to the same, as the largest average value of jobs in a queue, among all job queues requiring type-VM(s). The quantity of VMs in a buy-bid is set to the number of unscheduled jobs in the queue with the largest average value as computed above. The quantity of VMs in a sell-bid is the overall number of VMs of the type that the cloud can provide. All VMs purchased via the auction are used to serve jobs from the queue with the maximum average value. A cloud maintains the minimum number of servers to support those jobs, and only drops a job when its maximum tolerable response delay is reached.
B. Individual Profit and Social Welfare
We compare the time-averaged profit achieved at each cloud with our dynamic algorithm in Algorithm 1 and with the heuristic algorithm, after the system has been running for 2000 h. Fig. 2 shows that our algorithm can achieve a higher profit than the heuristic, at each of the 10 clouds, when the value of is no less than . The observation from Fig. 3 is that when is larger, the individual profit with our algorithm is even better since it is closer to the offline optimum. We next compare the social welfare achieved with Algorithm 1, the heuristic, and the dynamic benchmark Algorithm 2. Fig. 4 shows that social welfare achieved with Algorithm 1 is mostly within 7.7% of that by the benchmark algorithm, even under our heterogenous settings. It outperforms the heuristic by 19.2%. The social welfare is larger at larger 's in cases of both Algorithm 1 and the benchmark algorithm, verifying Theorems 6 and 8 in that they approach the respective offline optimum when grows.
C. Response Delay and Job Drop
We next investigate the scheduling delays experienced by jobs. In our system, a maximum tolerable response delay is set as the SLA objective for each type of jobs. Here, we study the average response delay actually experienced by the jobs, when the longer maximum tolerable response delay is set to different values. Fig. 5(a) shows that both Algorithm 1 and the benchmark algorithm incur a low average response delay (well ahead of scheduling deadlines), as compared to that of the heuristic. The reasons are: 1) the heuristic algorithm always greedily keeps jobs in queues for future scheduling until near the deadline; and 2) both Algorithm 1 and the benchmark algorithm evaluate the scheduling urgency better than the heuristic does, such that jobs are tended to be served well before the deadlines.
We also study the percentage of admitted jobs in the entire federation that are eventually dropped with the three algorithms. Fig. 5(b) reveals that the drop rate decreases quickly with the increase of the allowed maximum tolerable response delay, and Algorithm 1 and the benchmark algorithm again outperform the heuristic, due to their well-designed scheduling strategies.
We next examine the average response delay and job-drop percentage for different job types with Algorithm 1. The maximum response delay is set as 300 h. Here, for ease of presentation, we only consider the jobs requiring small CPU resource. Hence, the memory demand is the bottleneck and will determine the volume of VMs each server can provide. Table V summarizes the examined job types. From Fig. 6 , we see the trend that jobs with shorter maximum tolerable delay and/or lower resource demand, i.e., smaller and/or lower memory requirement, have shorter average response delays but higher drop percentages. It can be explained as follows: 1) a shorter maximum tolerable delay makes the jobs more urgent for scheduling (thus a shorter average response delay), but also more likely to hit their deadlines (thus a higher drop percentage); and 2) a lower resource demand renders the jobs easier to serve (thus a shorter average response delay), however, also decreases the drop penalty for these jobs (thus a higher drop percentage).
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates both individual-profit maximizing and social-welfare efficient strategies at individual selfish clouds in a cloud federation, in VM trades across cloud boundaries. We tailor a truthful, individual-rational, ex-post budget-balanced double auction as the intercloud trading mechanism, and design a dynamic algorithm for each cloud to decide the best VM valuation and bidding strategies, and to schedule job service/drop and server provisioning in the most economic fashion, under time-varying job arrivals and operational costs. The proposed algorithm can obtain a time-averaged profit for each cloud within a constant gap to its offline maximum, as well as a close-to-optimum social welfare in the entire federation, based on both solid theoretical analysis and trace-driven simulation studies under realistic setting. As future work, we are interested in broadening our investigations to front-end job pricing and competition for customers among the clouds, and the connection between front-end charging strategies and intercloud trading strategies in a cloud federation. In this work, we assume that all jobs are served within one time-slot after being scheduled. We will extend the study to more realistic scenarios where the time needed to complete a job can span multiple time-slots.
